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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
•00O00-
TAMMY HERRING (LAMB), 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., an 
Arizona corporation, and 
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 910018 
(Priority 16) 
-00O00-
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE KENNETH R. RIGTRUP 
JURISDICTION 
1. Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this Appeal. 
2. This Appeal is from judgments and final orders 
(denominated (1) Order and Judgment [granting defendant Curtis 
Industries7 Motion for Summary Judgment], dated June 13, 1990; 
(2) Judgment on the Verdict [in favor of defendant B & B 
Amusements], dated September 18, 1990; and (3) Order [denying 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial], dated December 5, 1990) 
1 
entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (the Honorable Kenneth R. Rigtrup). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether, in this two-defendant tort action, the 
District Court committed reversible error in granting defen-
dant-appellee Curtis Industries/ Motion for Summary Judgment 
and, thereby, denying plaintiff-appellant Ms. Lamb her day in 
court against that defendant and affording the remaining 
defendant-appellee, B & B Amusements, an "empty chair" at which 
that defendant might point. 
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding 
this issue is summarized as follows: 
"We accord no deference to a trial court's 
legal conclusions given to support the 
grant of a summary judgment, but review 
them for correctness." Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). In review-
ing summary judgments, all the evidence and 
reasonable inferences are liberally con-
strued in favor of the party opposing the 
motion. The court is free to reappraise 
the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 
1033, 1039 (Utah 1989). "[W]hen on an 
appeal from a motion for summary judgment, 
we inquire whether there is any genuine 
issue as to any material fact and, if there 
is not, whether the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Arrow Indus, v. Zions First National Bank. 
767 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988).l 
Credit for this and other statements of the appropriate 
standard of appellate review is given to Judge Norman Jackson 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, with those statements being 
taken, verbatim, from Judge Jackson's "Suiomary of Standards of 
Review." 
2 
2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in ruling that the standard of care, with respect to Ms. Lamb's 
claim against B & B Amusements, was simple negligence, as 
opposed to the extraordinarily high standard of care to which 
common carriers are held. 
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding 
this issue is summarized as follows: 
An appeal challenging the refusal to give 
jury instructions presents questions of law 
only. Therefore, we grant no particular 
deference to the trial court's rulings. 
Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 
1989). 
3. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in allowing (given the procedural history of the case and 
given, specifically, its granting of the Curtis Industries 
Motion for Summary Judgment) B & B Amusements' expert to give 
the testimony he gave (including his conclusion that the 
subject accident was, most likely, the result of a defective or 
"flawed" bolt or of a "counterfeit" bolt). 
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding 
this issue is summarized as follows: 
Admissibility of Evidence: "It is well 
settled that trial court rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are not to be 
overturned in the absence of a clear abuse 
of discretion." State v. Griffiths. 752 
P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. 
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a)); accord State v. Aase. 762 
P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1988); State v. 
Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. 1989). 
3 
"In reviewing questions of admissibility of 
evidence at trial, deference is given to 
the trial court's advantageous position; 
thus, that court's rulings regarding admis-
sibility will not be overturned absent an 
abuse of discretion." Whitehead v. Ameri-
can Motors Sales Corp.. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 
(1989) ; 
4. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in denying Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial and rejecting, 
specifically, in addition to the Rule 59(a)(7) "error in law" 
arguments appertaining to the foregoing three claims of error, 
Ms. Lamb's Rule 59(a)(3) argument regarding "surprise" and her 
Rule 59(a)(6) argument regarding "insufficiency of the evi-
dence ." 
The applicable standard of appellate review regarding 
this issue is summarized as follows: 
"We consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and we will not 
overturn that verdict when it is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence." 
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. DaIton, 745 P.2d 
1239, 1242 (Utah 1987); accord Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
Resolution of factual dispute is a matter 
for the jury which will not be upset on 
appeal unless evidence on the issue "'so 
clearly preponderates in favor of the ap-
pellant that reasonable people would not 
differ on the outcome of the case./M 
Cambelt. 745 P.2d at 1242 (quoting E.A. 
Strout Western Realty Agency. Inc. v. W.C. 
Fov & Sons. Inc.. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 
1983)) . 
M/To successfully attack the verdict, an 
appellant must marshall all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate 
that, even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to that verdict, the 
4 
evidence is insufficient to support it.'11 
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242 (quoting Von Hake 
at 769, which in turn cites Scharf v. BMG 
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068f 1070 (Utah 1985)); 
see id. at 1242 n.l (Scharf burden still 
relevant to challenge to jury's factfinding 
after 1987 amendment of R.52(a)). 
A trial court's grant or denial of a motion 
for new trial will not be overturned on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake 
Electr. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. Constr. 
Inc.. 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah App. 1989). 
The general rule concerning abuse of dis-
cretion is that the appellate court "will 
presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." 
Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984) (quoted with approval in 
Donohue. 748 P.2d at 1068). But a trial 
court has no discretion to grant a new 
trial absent a showing of at least one of 
the grounds set forth in Rule 59(a). 
Tanaaro v. Marrero. 13 Utah 2d 290f 373 
P.2d 390, 391 n.2 (1969); Moon Lake. 767 
P.2d at 128. 
"[A]n insufficiency-of-the-evidence based 
challenge to a denial of [a Rule 59(a)(6) 
new trial motion] is governed by one stan-
dard of review: we reverse only if, view-
ing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the party who prevailed, we con-
clude that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart. 
761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) (citing King v. 
Fereday. 739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah 1987); 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & 
Gunnel1, 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). 
Appellants making such a claim must mar-
shall all the evidence supporting the ver-
dict and then show that the evidence cannot 
support the verdict. Hansen. 761 P.2d at 
18. 
If the Motion was denied, the appellate 
court is to sustain the denial if there was 
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"an evidentiary basis for the jury's deci-
sion." Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 
732 (Utah 1982). The appellate court can 
reverse the denial of the motion only if 
"the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable or unjust." Id. (quoting 
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977)). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Ms. Lamb seeks reversal of the granting of the Curtis 
Industries Motion for Summary Judgment, reversal of the Judg-
ment on the Verdict in favor of B & B, and remand to the 
District Court with instructions that one new trial be held, at 
which both defendants will appear as defendants. She also 
seeks her costs of court, assessable against both defendants, 
in connection with this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Tammy Herring (Lamb)2 was injured on or about 
September 4, 1986, while attending the Utah State Fair. The 
concessionaire at the fair was defendant-appellee B & B Amuse-
ments Corp. ("B & B"), an Arizona corporation. The accident 
occurred while plaintiff, with her three-year-old son, was 
riding the children's roller coaster owned and operated by B & 
B. 
2Ms. Lamb was between her two marriages at the time of the 
subject accident and at the time of the initiation of the 
lawsuit. Her first husband is surnamed Herring. Shortly 
before trial, plaintiff remarried. She is now known as Tammy 
Lamb. 
6 
Ms. Lamb and her son were riding in the third car of a 
five-car train when the second and third cars of that train 
became separated while the train was in motion. Ms. Lamb 
allegedly sustained serious bodily injuries as a result of the 
separation of the cars. 
Ms. Lamb filed her Complaint against B & B, alleging, 
inter alia, negligence in the maintenance and/or inspection of 
the subject train. In response to an Interrogatory, B & B 
stated that the reason that the cars had separated was that a 
bolt connecting the cars had broken. In response to a later 
Interrogatory, B & B identified defendant-appellee Curtis 
Industries, Inc. ("Curtis") as the manufacturer and seller to B 
& B of the subject bolt. After obtaining that information, 
Ms. Lamb (without necessarily accepting the proposition that 
the bolt broke (as opposed to its having fallen out after 
losing its restraining nut or cotter pin)) amended her Com-
plaint to name Curtis as an additional defendant and asserted 
claims against that defendant sounding in strict products 
liability and negligence in connection with Curtis7s manufac-
ture and sale of the subject bolt to B & B. 
Both defendants moved for summary judgment. Judge Rigtrup 
denied the B & B Motion, but granted the Curtis Motion.3 
3The Curtis Motion was primarily based on the fact that 
Ms. Lamb's expert witness was of the opinion that the fault in 
connection with the separation lay entirely with B & B. Judge 
Rigtrup issued no memorandum opinion accompanying his granting 
(continued...) 
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Ms. Lamb then sought—unsuccessfully—via pre-trial mo-
tions, to prevent B & B from putting on evidence supporting the 
proposition that the separation of the cars was due to a 
defective bolt. At trial, B & B's expert offered his opinion 
that the most likely explanation for the separation was that a 
"flawed" bolt broke. Six of the eight jurors answered in the 
negative to the first question on the special verdict form, to 
wit: "Was B & B Amusements negligent?" Judge Rigtrup entered 
Judgment of No Cause of Action on that Verdict. 
Ms. Lamb then filed a Motion for a New Trial, contending 
that she should be granted a new trial against both defendants 
and, specifically, that Judge Rigtrup erred, as a matter of 
law, in (1) granting the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(2) failing to instruct the jury that an extraordinarily high 
standard of care, such as that imposed by law on common carri-
ers, was the standard to which B & B should be held; and (3) 
allowing (given the procedural history of the case and given, 
specifically, the Court's granting of the Curtis Motion for 
Summary Judgment) B & B's expert to give the said opinion 
3(...continued) 
of the Curtis Motion, but he did issue a Minute Entry (Record 
at 504). It appears that he based his ruling on his view that 
res ipsa loquitur does not apply to strict liability issues and 
on his belief that no evidence of negligence would be presented 
at trial against Curtis, given Ms. Lamb's expert's opinion, and 
given the fact that neither the bolt nor any part thereof could 
be produced as evidence (B & B's agents having testified in 
depositions that they found and discarded the only part of the 
bolt that they claimed was found). 
8 
testimony he gave. Ms. Lamb also contended, in connection with 
that New Trial Motion, (a) that she was, in the rubric of Rule 
59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudicially 
surprised by the Court's allowing B & B's expert to testify as 
he did, in light of, among other things, the Court's granting 
of the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment, B & B's agents' 
supposed discarding of the supposedly broken bolt, and B & B's 
failure to supplement, prior to trial, its answers to 
Ms. Lamb's expert-witness Interrogatories; and (b) that, in the 
rubric of Rule 59(a)(6) of these Rules, there was insufficient 
evidence to support the verdict of B & B's non-negligence. 
Judge Rigtrup denied Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial, 
and this Appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of facts and procedural 
history material to a consideration of the questions presented: 
1. On or about September 4, 1986, while attending the 
Utah State Fair, and while, specifically, she and her son were 
riding, for a fare (Tr. at 264), a "kiddie" roller coaster 
owned and operated by B & B, Ms. Lamb was injured. She claims 
to have suffered severe and permanent neck and related inju-
ries, including debilitating and disabling headaches. She put 
on evidence that she had incurred, up to the time of trial, 
medical expenses in the principal amount of $7,948.37 (Trial 
Exhibit 10); and lost income, up to the time of trial, in the 
9 
amount of $31,862.00 (Trial Exhibit 19). She also put on 
evidence, through expert testimony, of future economic losses 
of a then-present value in excess of $600,000.00 (Trial Exhibit 
19). 
2. B & B took the position, at trial, that Ms. Lamb 
reported, in the immediate aftermath of the incident, that she 
had sustained an injury, albeit a relatively very minor one, 
consisting of bumps to her knees suffered when the subject cars 
separated. Tr. at 60 (testimony of Buddy Mertin, B & B's 
president); Tr. at 460 (testimony of Dr. Tom Blotter, B & B's 
expert). 
3. B & B contends that the disconnection of the two cars 
of the kiddie roller coaster was caused by a bolt that broke 
(e.g., Buddy Mertin testimony, Tr. at 69-81); and that B & B 
people, possibly as many as six, searched for an hour to find 
the parts of the bolt, found one part of the bolt, did not find 
the other part, and discarded the part of the bolt that they 
did find (Buddy Mertin testimony, Tr. at 71-75). 
4. B & B purchased the bolt from Curtis. B & B's Answer 
to Interrogatory No. 1 of Plaintiffs' Second Set Interrogato-
ries. 
5. Ms. Lamb initially sued B & B only and, after B & B 
so identified Curtis as the seller of the bolt that allegedly 
broke, named Curtis as an additional defendant. Third Amended 
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Complaint, Record at 123-32. In that pleading Ms. Lamb assert-
ed claims against Curtis sounding in strict liability (Record 
at 128-29) and in negligence (Record at 129-30). 
6. On or about February 5, 1990, B & B filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Record at 153-54. 
7. On or about May 11, 1990, Curtis filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Record at 221-22. 
8. Judge Rigtrup heard both defendants' Summary Judgment 
Motions at the same hearing (Tr. at 1-39). He granted the 
Curtis Motion, apparently for reasons discussed in footnote 3 
hereto, pages 7-8 hereof. 
9. With respect to the B & B Motion, Judge Rigtrup ruled 
that Ms. Lamb could proceed to trial on her negligence claim. 
Record at 520-21. 
10. In response to Interrogatories regarding expert 
witnesses, the only responses B & B ever gave were the follow-
ing: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 [of Ms. Lamb's First 
Set of Interrogatories to B & B]: Identify 
all expert witnesses. 
ANSWER: Defendants [sic] have not yet 
determined whether or not it will call any 
expert witnesses. As soon as that decision 
has been made, these interrogatories [sic] 
will be supplemented and that information 
will be provided. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 [of that same set of 
Interrogatories]: With respect to each 
expert witness you have identified in your 
answer to Interrogatory No. 3, state: 
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(a) His profession or occupation, and the 
field in which he is claimed to be an 
expert; 
(b) The formal education and specialized 
training he has received in his field; 
(c) Licenses which he now holds authoriz-
ing him to practice in his field; 
(d) The professional experience and work 
he has had in his field during the 
past five years; 
(e) The compensation, if any, he is to 
receive for his work and efforts in 
connection with this litigation; 
(f) The subject matter on which he is 
expected to testify: 
(g) Describe any tests, examinations or 
studies he performed: 
(h) The substance of the facts and opin-
ions to which he is expected to testi-
fy; 
(i) A summary of the grounds for each such 
opinion: 
(j) Identify any written or recorded 
statements, reports, documents or 
correspondence received from him by 
you, or your counsel, agents, or em-
ployees; 
(k) Identify all persons who assisted him 
in preparing any reports or documents, 
in conducting any test, examination or 
studies, or in preparing his opinions 
or his testimony and describe the 
nature of the assistance rendered; 
(1) Describe any previous experience in 
his field which involved matters simi-
lar to those encountered in this acci-
dent ; 
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(m) If he has testified previously as an 
expert witness in any court, before 
any administrative tribunal, in arbi-
tration proceedings, or before any 
governmental or legislative body, 
state when, identify on behalf of whom 
such testimony was given, state the 
opinions and inferences to which he 
has testified, the facts and data upon 
which the opinions and inferences were 
based, and identify before whom such 
testimony was given, including for any 
adversary proceeding, the names of all 
parties, plaintiff and defendant, the 
name and division of the court or 
other tribunal, the civil action num-
ber, the identity and location of the 
court and reporter or other custodian 
of the pleadings and transcript, the 
identity of the lawyers representing 
each party and the citation to any 
appeals arising out of the trial; 
(n) Identify all articles, treatises, 
manuscripts, books or other writings 
authorized in whole or in part by him; 
(o) Describe each course taught by him, 
identify each instruction for whom the 
course was taught, and state the date 
of each teaching; 
(p) State whether any professional licens-
es held by him have been suspended, or 
revoked, and if so, identify by whom, 
state when, and describe all reasons 
for such suspension or revocation. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(Emphasis added.) 
11. On or about January 25, 1990, in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, B & B submitted the Affidavit of 
P. Thomas Blotter. The only substantive opinions set forth in 
that Affidavit are the following: 
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7. That the normal wear experienced by 
the bolt would not be observable from 
the car performance or from a visual 
inspection of the roller coaster. 
8. That if the regular maintenance proce-
dures were followed, they were ade-
quate and the failure of the bolt was 
not the result of operation or mainte-
nance practices. 
Record at 149. 
12. At no time, prior to trial, did B & B inform 
Ms. Lamb, formally or informally, that Dr. Blotter was going to 
give the crucial opinion testimony that he ultimately gave (Tr. 
at 417-20; 426), to wit: that the bolt B & B purchased from 
Curtis was or may have been defective, either in terms of its 
having had a "flaw" or its having been a "counterfeit bolt," 
and that those two explanations were the two most likely 
explanations for the bolt's failure. 
13. On or about June 14, 1990, Ms. Lamb submitted a 
"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' [her son was still in the 
case at that time] Position that the Standard of Care for 
Common Carriers should be Applied to Defendant B & B Amuse-
ments." Record at 489-94. 
14. On or about August 17, 1990, B & B submitted, in 
response to that Memorandum and by way of setting forth its own 
view with respect to which standard of care should apply, 
"Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Position that 
the Standard of Ordinary Care should be Applied to B & B 
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Amusements." Record at 271-82. 
15. In the course of a pre-trial meeting in chambers, 
Judge Rigtrup determined to adopt B & B's position with respect 
to the appropriate standard of care and to reject Ms. Lamb's. 
E.g., Tr. at 494-95. The ordinary care standard was the 
standard used in the instructions to the jury. Jury Instruc-
tion No. 12, Record at 374. 
16. On or about August 13, 1990, Ms. Lamb submitted her 
First Motion in Limine. Record at 539-40. That Motion asked, 
among other things, "that the Court rule that B & B had an 
extraordinary duty of care, with respect to plaintiffs, commen-
surate with that of a common carrier"; and 
that the Court rule, as suggested in plain-
tiff s' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs7 
Objection to Curtis Industries7 Proposed 
Order and Judgment, dated June 11, 1990 
[Record at 497-500], that (the Court having 
heretofore granted defendant Curtis Indus-
tries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment) 
B & B should not be allowed to, and may 
not, seek to adduce evidence in any way 
related to a supposedly defective bolt 
(please note that B & B has stated, under 
oath, in answers to Interrogatories, that 
it purchased the bolt in guestion from 
defendant Curtis Industries). 
17. On or about August 16, 1990, B & B filed its "Objec-
tion to Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine." Record at .4 
In that submission, B & B argued, without mentioning 
4For whatever reason, this submission appears not to be 
included in the Record. A copy is attached hereto, at pages 
12-15 of the Appendix. 
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Dr. Blotters proposed testimony, as follows: 
Defendant B & B has maintained throughout 
the course of this litigation that the bolt 
utilized in the connector between the cars 
failed in this application. Plaintiffs 
have produced no rationale why that evi-
dence, as testified to by the witnesses in 
their depositions, should not be presented 
to the jury. The reasonable inferences 
that the iurv may or may not draw from that 
is left to the sound discretion of the 
jury. 
Record at (see footnote 4) . (Emphasis added.) 
18. Ms. Lamb then submitted "Plaintiffs' Reply to B i B's 
Objection to Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions in Limine." 
Record at 309-14. That submission included, in pertinent part, 
the following: 
With respect to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs7 
First Motion in Limine (seeking to prevent 
B & B from presenting evidence relating to 
[a] supposedly "defective" bolt), plain-
tiffs are of the view that the appropriate 
resolution will be for the Court to allow 
the B & B agents to describe what they 
claim they saw (i.e., for at least one of 
B & B's agents, a part of a broken bolt), 
but that B & B should not be allowed to 
attempt to produce evidence or make direct 
commentary regarding the supposedly "defec-
tive" bolt. Plaintiffs rely, in this re-
gard, on the following, in addition to the 
reasons set forth in their initial Motion: 
Interrogatory No. 11 of Plaintiffs' First 
Set of Interrogatories provides: 
State whether you claim that the roll-
er coaster was in any way defective at 
the time of the accident and, if so, 
describe in detail and with particu-
larity the nature of all defects. 
B & B answered as follows: 
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Defendant has not yet determined 
whether or not any part of the roller 
coaster was defective at the time of 
the accident. If defendant claims 
that the roller coaster was defective, 
this information will be supplemented 
to provide that information. 
This answer has not been supplemented, in 
any fashion. 
Record at 310-11. That Answer to that Interrogatory was never 
supplemented. 
19. At trial, as indicated hereinabove, Judge Rigtrup 
instructed the jury on the simple negligence, ordinary standard 
of care, as opposed to the common carrier, extraordinarily high 
standard of care. Record at 374. 
20. At trial, counsel for B & B, in the course of cross-
examining Ms. Lamb's expert witness on liability, raised the 
question of whether "there might be a problem with the bolt 
itself, with the actual manufacture of [the] bolt." Tr. at 
2 03. Later in the course of that cross-examination, the 
following exchange occurred between B & B's counsel, Ms. Lamb's 
counsel, and the Court: 
Q. [by B & B's counsel]: Excuse me. Were-
n't there some problems — haven't there 
been some problems with some imported Tai-
wanese bolts that had improper markings and 
were defective and causing problems in this 
area? 
[Ms. Lamb's counsel]: I think it has been 
established in this case, through discov-
ery, that there is no contention, in this 
lawsuit and there is [sic] no facts to 
support the proposition, that there was any 
defect in manufacture involved here. . . . 
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[The Court]: Overruled. Proceed. 
Tr. at 222. 
21. In the course of the direct examination of Dr. Tom 
Blotter, B & B's expert, the Court allowed, over Ms. Lamb's 
counsels objection5 (Tr. at 417), Dr. Blotter to testify about 
the possibility of flaws and counterfeit bolts (Tr. at 417 to 
420) and that the two most likely explanations for the failure 
were "flaw" and "counterfeit" bolt. Tr. at 426. 
22. As reflected in the Judgment on the Verdict, dated 
September 18, 1990 (Record at 401-04), six of the eight jurors 
determined that B & B was not negligent and, accordingly, Judge 
Rigtrup entered a Judgment of No Cause of Action against 
Ms. Lamb and in favor of B & B. 
23. Ms. Lamb then filed her Motion for a New Trial, along 
with a supporting Memorandum (Record at 412-30), and the 
affidavit of her undersigned trial counsel (with respect to the 
testimony of Dr. Blotter) (Record at 410-11). B & B filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial 
(Record at 435-44), along with the affidavit of its trial 
counsel (with respect to the testimony of Dr. Blotter) (Record 
at 445-47). Curtis submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to 
5No Transcript mention is made of Ms. Lamb's counsel's 
objection, per se, but the context of the sidebar conference 
requested (Tr. at 417; lines 10-11) is quite clear, especially 
in light of the above-cited record of earlier proceedings in 
this case. 
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Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Record at 431-34). 
Ms. Lamb submitted her reply memoranda to the memoranda of both 
defendants (Record at 452-64 with respect to B & B and Record 
at 6 with respect to Curtis). Oral argument was had on 
Ms. Lamb's Motion, and Judge Rigtrup denied the Motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in granting the 
Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Lamb's claims against 
Curtis sounded in both strict liability and negligence. Record 
evidence existed and was brought to Judge Rigtrup's attention, 
in the course of the Curtis Summary Judgment Motion proceed-
ings, to support the proposition, for purposes relevant to the 
Curtis Summary Judgment Motion, that the injuries complained of 
by Ms. Lamb may have come about, at least in part, by virtue of 
the breaking of a defective bolt. The mere fact that 
Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view (as set forth in his Affida-
vit (Record at 166-67) and deposition testimony), that the 
failure was solely the result of B & B's negligence, was not 
dispositive on the issues of Curtis's liability. Ms. Lamb's 
expert's holding and giving that opinion did not mandate 
dismissal of the claims against Curtis, especially in the face 
of B & B's contention, made in its own Motion for Summary 
6For whatever reason, this submission appears not to be 
included in the Record. A copy is included herewith, at pages 
16-18 of the Appendix. 
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Judgment, that its people followed a satisfactory and non-
negligent regimen of maintenance and inspection and that that 
rendered B & B non-negligent. Judge Rigtrup should have 
followed clear precedent from other jurisdictions and nearly 
clear precedent from this Court and should havef accordingly, 
denied the Curtis Motion. Ms. Lamb is entitled to go to trial 
against Curtis. 
II. 
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error when he rejected 
Ms. Lamb's contention that the standard on which the jury 
should be instructed, with respect to B 4 B's alleged negli-
gence, was the extraordinarily high standard to which common 
carriers are held. There isf as of yetf no Utah appellate 
court law with respect to the standard of care demanded of 
amusement park operators. This Court should follow the better 
view and adopt, in the interest of sound public policy, the 
extraordinarily high standard adopted by other states and 
should lay down the law that Utah amusement park ride operators 
are to be held to that high standard. This Court should remand 
this matter for a new trial against B & B on that basis alone. 
III. 
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error, in the circum-
stances and dynamics of this case, in allowing Dr. Tom Blotter, 
B & B's liability expert, to testify that the subject bolt may 
have been "flawed" or "counterfeit" and to testify that the two 
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most likely causes of failure were (a) that the bolt was 
"flawed" and (b) that the bolt was "counterfeit." Contrary to 
the letter and spirit of Rule 33(a) and Rule 26(e)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, B & B failed to notify Ms. Lamb, 
in timely fashion, prior to trial, that Dr. Blotter would 
testify as he did. In the circumstances of this case, Ms. Lamb 
was unfairly and prejudicially surprised by such testimony. 
When it came out she had no meaningful opportunity to rebut it. 
If Dr. Blotter had not been allowed to testify as he did, there 
would have been, from any reasonable perspective, given the 
other trial evidence, a legally insufficient basis for the jury 
to conclude that B & B was not negligent. This is especially 
true given the fact that the Court properly instructed the jury 
on res ipsa loquitur with respect to B & B and, by doing so, 
informed the jury, in essence, that B & B was legally obligated 
to come forward with evidence reasonably countering the infer-
ence of negligence. 
IV. 
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial against both defendants. In 
the context of Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New Trial and proceed-
ings appertaining thereto, Ms. Lamb brought to Judge Rigtrup's 
attention errors of law which had been the subject of pre-trial 
proceedings (the granting of the Curtis Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the decision to instruct the jury on the simple 
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negligence standard of care), as well as a ruling made, in the 
course of trial, over Ms. Lamb's pre-trial and trial objec-
tions, to allow Dr. Blotter to testify as he did. In that 
Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Lamb also argued that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's 6-2 verdict of non-
negligence. Judge Rigtrup's failure to order a new trial, in 
the circumstances and dynamics of this case, constitutes an 
abuse of discretion and a basis independent from the foregoing 
three points to order a new trial against both defendants. 
V. 
This Court should order a new trial against both defen-
dants, even if it finds that the only reversible error that 
Judge Rigtrup committed was in granting the Curtis Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This is not a criminal case to which princi-
ples of double jeopardy attach. Public policy and fundamental 
fairness dictate that Ms. Lamb's claims against B & B be 
retried even if this Court determines that no reversible error 
was committed with respect to the claims against B & B, so that 
Curtis will not be able to do what B & B did in the first 
trial, which is to point at an "empty chair" in the courtroom. 
Ms. Lamb did nothing wrong. She was injured, to one 
degree or another, either as a result of a defectively or 
negligently manufactured bolt or as a result of negligence of 
the operator of the roller coaster, or both. It makes no sense 
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that she has, to date, been denied recovery. She should be 
allowed to go to trial against both defendants simultaneously. 
A contrary result would work a continued frustration of 
the doing of justice in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN GRANTING THE CURTIS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As is suggested in the foregoing discussion, there came a 
time in this litigation, after Curtis had been named as a 
defendant and after Ms. Lamb's liability expert, David 
Stephens, had been deposed, that Curtis Industries, the manu-
facturer of the subject bolt, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Memorandum of Curtis Industries (Record at 214-
20) offered utterly no legal authority in support of that 
Motion. It appears to have been based solely on the notion 
that Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view that it was B & B's 
negligence, rather than Curtis's allegedly defective bolt, 
which caused the accident. The mere fact that an expert, even 
a plaintiff's expert holds such a view is, however, not dispos 
itive and should not have been so viewed by Judge Rigtrup. 
This is especially true in a case, such as this, where there 
was record evidence (here, the B & B assertions that they did 
everything right, from a maintenance and inspection perspec-
tive) of contrary factual assertions. See, e.g., Hughes v. 
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American Jawa, Ltd,, 529 F.2d 21, 23-25 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Webster v. Offshore Food Service, Inc. 434 F.2d 1191# 1193 
(5th Cir. 1970); Gillentine v. McKeand, 426 F.2d 717, 722 (1st 
Cir. 1970); Elliott v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 388 
F.2d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1968); G. D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. 
Pfizer & Co.. 231 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1956); Castleberrv v. 
Collierville Med. Ass., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 492, 494 (W. D. Tenn. 
1981). B & B contended, at the same summary judgment stage of 
the proceedings, that the bolt broke and that it was not 
negligent and offered record evidence in support of those 
propositions. See B & B's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at 2-4 (Record at 137-42). Ms* Lamb also 
brought such things to the District Courts attention, in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Curtis Industries' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at 230) and in the course 
of the oral argument on the Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tr. at 33-34). The fact that Ms. Lamb's expert happened to 
agree with the contention advanced by Curtis Industries should 
not, especially on the record established in this case at that 
time, have caused the District Court to conclude that the 
Curtis Motion should be granted. 
Judge Rigtrup should have recognized, in short, that it 
was for the jury to determine whether Curtis or B & B, or both, 
was or were liable in damages to Ms. Lamb who, unquestionably, 
did nothing wrong in connection with the subject incident. 
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As Ms. Lamb contended in her Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Curtis Industries' Proposed Order and 
Judgment (Record at 497-500), by way of response to some things 
that came up in the course of the oral argument on the Curtis 
Motion, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied 
against two or more defendants in joint control of the instru-
mentality in question. See, First National Bank of Arizona v. 
Otis Elevator Co., 406 P.2d 430, 435 (Ariz. 1965); Jackson v. 
H. H. Robertson Co.. 574 P.2d 822, 825-26 (Ariz. 1978). As 
Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel sought to explain to Judge 
Rigtrup, control over the bolt in question was exercised, 
first, by Curtis Industries during the manufacturing stage. 
Any negligent (and/or strict liability-related) conduct, with 
respect to the manufacture of the bolt, would have occurred 
during the time the bolt was in the control of Curtis. The 
bolt was sold directly by Curtis to B & B. Judge Rigtrup 
should have recognized that it was wrong to grant summary 
judgment to a party (Curtis) whose acts or omissions were, by 
the process of elimination, the cause of Ms. Lamb's injuries 
if, indeed, (as the jury ultimately found) the other possible 
actor (B & B Amusements) was found to be non-negligent and non-
liable. Judge Rigtrup should certainly have recognized, as 
Ms. Lamb ardently sought to convince him, that, consistent with 
the spirit of the res ipsa doctrine, the burden should have 
been placed on Curtis (as it ultimately was, at the trial, 
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placed on B & B) to show that it was not liable when Ms. Lamb 
was in an inferior position in terms of her ability to prove 
negligence or strict liability against Curtis. See, Siealer v. 
Kuhlman, 473 P.2d 445, 449-450 (Wash. App. 1970), reversed on 
other grounds, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972). 
Ms. Lamb also brought to the attention of Judge Rigtrup, 
by her submission entitled "Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum 
in Opposition to Curtis Industries' Proposed Order and Judg-
ment" (Record at 506-19), the fact that certain well-reasoned 
cases of some other jurisdictions pointed the way toward the 
Judge Rigtrup's recognizing that it would be inappropriate and 
contrary to the interests of justice, in the circumstances of 
this case, to cut loose the manufacturer of the bolt. The 
cases are Anderson v. Somberg. 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1974), and 
Ybarra v. Spanaard. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945). Copies of both 
were attached to plaintiff's said Supplemental Memorandum. 
Both of those cases addressed the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine when multiple defendants are involved in a 
tort case. 
Ybarra involved a patient who was injured during the 
course of a surgical operation. The plaintiff in that case 
brought suit against several health care providers who partici-
pated in his care and who might have caused his injuries. The 
defendants' two primary defenses to the application of res ipsa 
were: (1) that where there are several defendants, where there 
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is a division of responsibility in the use of an instrumentali-
ty causing the injury, and where the injury might have resulted 
from the separate act of one of two or more persons, the rule 
of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked against any one of them; 
and (2) that where there are several instrumentalities, and no 
showing is made as to which caused the injury or as to the 
particular defendant in control of it, the doctrine cannot 
apply. Id. at 688-89. 
The California Supreme Court, more than 45 years prior to 
Judge Rigtrup's ruling, rejected those defenses to the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur and held that neither the number of 
defendants nor the relationship of defendants alone determines 
whether the doctrine applies. Id. at 690. That court criti-
cized a limited application of res ipsa loquitur because such 
an application would "preclude its application . . . in cases 
where it is most important that it should be applied." Id. at 
689. 
Anderson v. Sombera involved a plaintiff who was injured 
during surgery when part of the forceps used during the proce-
dure broke off in his spine. The plaintiff brought suit 
against the doctor, the hospital, the manufacturer, and the 
supplier of the forceps. The New Jersey Supreme Court there 
recognized that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had been 
expanded to cover multiple defendants even where a plaintiff 
could not show that it was more probable than not that the 
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injury resulted from the negligence of one particular defen-
dant, 3 38 A.2d at 5. The Anderson court recognized, some 15 
years before Judge Rigtrup granted the Curtis Motion for 
Summary Judgment, that the res ipsa doctrine had been expanded 
to embrace cases "where the negligence cause was not the only 
or most probable theory in the case, but where the alternate 
theories of liability [together] accounted for the only possi-
ble causes of injury." Id. (citations omitted). The Anderson 
court noted, furthermore, that in cases of this type, "no 
defendant can be entitled to prevail on a motion for judgment 
until all the proofs have been presented to the court and 
Jury." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
Based on the rationale of Ybarra and Anderson, Curtis 
should, clearly, not have been granted summary judgment with 
respect to Ms. Lamb's claims. Ms. Lamb should have been 
granted a trial against Curtis, on those authorities alone. 
Also most instructive on the question of whether the 
Curtis Motion should have been granted are cases such as the 
following, all dealing with products liability claims, and all 
supporting Ms. Lamb's contention, made before Judge Rigtrup in 
connection with the Curtis Motion, that Curtis should not have 
been cut loose, by anything other than a jury verdict, in the 
dynamics of this case: Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 
720 (9th Cir. 1986); Hiqains v. General Motors Corp., 699 
S.W.2d 741 (Ark. 1985); Fain v. GTE Svlvania. Inc.. 652 S.W.2d 
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163 (Mo. App. 1983). 
Ms. Lamb is of the view that all of these non-Utah author-
ities point, quite clearly, toward the correctness of the 
proposition that she had advanced a claim easily sufficient to 
defeat the summary judgment contentions of Curtis. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, with respect to the 
Curtis Motion, Ms. Lamb also bring to the Court's attention its 
own opinion in Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990). Dalley was a multiple-defendant case 
dealing with alleged medical malpractice. This Court, after 
favorably discussing such cases as Ybarra (Id. at 198-99), had 
the following to say with respect to the matter of "multiple-
defendant liability": 
The second issue on appeal is whether mul-
tiple defendants may be held liable under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, thus 
relieving plaintiff of showing that partic-
ular defendants were involved. The very 
purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur is to allow a plaintiff who is unaware 
of the circumstances of his or her injury 
to establish the elements of negligence, 
including the possible defendants. 
Consistent with our opinion above, we hold 
that where the foundation of res ipsa lo-
guitur is established, all defendants who 
are charged with the safety of a helpless 
patient may be held liable where the only 
possible instrumentalities that could cause 
injury were within the defined area of an 
operating room under the control of all 
defendants and where the injury occurred to 
a part of the plaintiff's body not involved 
in the operation itself. Without some 
further explanation by defendants of how 
plaintiff was injured, they are considered 
29 
in control of the instrumentality, includ-
ing the hospital and the anesthesiologist. 
If any defendant can come forward with a 
conclusive exculpatory statement or expla-
nation of how the injury occurred, then the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not 
apply because there is no longer a need for 
an inference of negligence or causation. 
The justification for placing the inference 
of negligence and cause upon defendants in 
lieu of an explanation of how the injury 
occurred arises from the necessity to pro-
tect their rights of an innocent and help-
less patient. 
Id. at 200 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
The unanimous Dalley Court cited, in footnote 23, the case 
of Siealer v. Kuhlman, 473 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. App. 1970), 
reversed on other grounds. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), dis-
cussed hereinabove. Ms. Lamb recognizes that this is not a 
medical malpractice case and that the alleged fault of Curtis 
did not occur at the same time as the alleged fault of B & B. 
She submits, however, that those facts are irrelevant when one 
understands the dynamics and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine. See. Jackson v. H. H. Robertson Co.. 574 P.2d 822, 
825-26 (Ariz. 1979). She suggests that it is unlikely that, 
strictly speaking, the alleged misdeeds of the various health 
care professionals named as defendants in Dalley occurred, 
literally, at the same time. She suggests that the correct 
inquiry has to do with the universe of people in control of the 
subject situation. She suggests that, just as the various 
health care professionals involved in the care of the patient 
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in Dalley were, to one degree or another, in one capacity or 
another, and at one specific time or another, "in control" of 
the care of the patient in that case, Curtis and B & B were, on 
the record herein, the only two entities "controlling" the fate 
of Ms, Lamb. There is no good reason, in law or in logic, why 
this situation should be treated differently from the situation 
in Dalley. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO IMPOSE 
ON B & B A STANDARD OF CARE TANTAMOUNT 
TO THAT IMPOSED ON COMMON CARRIERS. 
The primary rationale for an increased standard of care — 
"the highest degree of care, skill, and diligence," the "high-
est practicable care," "extraordinary care and caution," — 13 
C.J.S. Carriers, §678 — appears to be that paying passengers 
surrender themselves, for pay, to the care and custody of the 
carrier in question. They give up their freedom of movement 
and actions. They are, generally, unable to prevent accidents. 
See, Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 
1964). The application of common sense suggests that these 
same considerations apply when one surrenders herself to the 
care of the operator of an amusement ride. 
Some courts have been willing to apply the highest stan-
dard of care, which common carriers owe to their passengers, to 
operators of certain amusement rides and devices. 4 Am.Jur.2d, 
Amusements and Exhibitions, §88. E.g.. Paiak v. Mamsch. 87 
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N.E.2d 147 (111, 1949) (operator of a ferris wheel held to the 
standard of care of a common carrier); Best Park & Amusement 
Co, v, Rollins, 68 So. 417 (Ala. 1915) (operator of a scenic 
railway held to the same high degree of care that was required 
of a common carrier). Some courts have applied the common 
carrier standard of care specifically to roller coaster and 
scenic railway rides. See, Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co.. 
55 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1932) (roller coaster operator must use the 
highest degree of care for passengers/ safety) ; Eiibeau v. Fred 
W. Pearce Corp. , 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928) (operators of a 
roller coaster or scenic railway owe passengers the highest 
degree of skill and diligence) ; Q/Callaahan v. Dcsllwood Park 
Co. . 89 N.E. 1005 (111. 1909) (common carrier standard of care 
to be applied to operator of scenic railroad). 
The upshot of these cases is that, even though the opera-
tor of an amusement ride may not, technically, meet the classic 
definition of a common carrier, numerous courts have been 
willing to impose the common carrier standard of care on 
amusement ride operators by reason of the fact that passengers 
of the rides in question have essentially entrusted their 
safety to the care and custody of the amusement ride operators, 
just as passengers of universally recognized "common carriers," 
such as bus, train, or airline companies, have implicitly 
entrusted their safety to the care and custody of those carri-
ers. 
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Although there is no case law in Utah concerning whether a 
roller coaster operator should be held to the same high stan-
dard to which a traditionally recognized common carrier is 
heldf Ms. Lamb believes that the reasoning of the above-cited 
cases is sound and points the way toward the appropriateness of 
the imposition of the highest standard of care on B S B's 
roller coaster operation. "It is not important whether [the] 
defendant [was] serving as a common carrier or [was] engaged in 
activities for amusement." Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's. Inc.. 396 
P.2d at 939 (Colo. 1964). The important factors include these: 
"the plaintiffs had surrendered themselves to the care and 
custody of the defendant; they had given up their freedom of 
movement and actions; [and] there was nothing they could do to 
cause or prevent the accident." Id. These factors appear, 
unquestionably, to apply to the conditions of Ms. Lamb at the 
time of the incident. 
The question of whether a passenger on a conveyance-for-
hire, such as a bus, a train, or a plane — or an amusement 
ride — is picked up at "point A" and dropped off at "point B" 
(as opposed to — for hire — being picked up at "point A" and, 
after whatever thrilling, scintillating, or interesting excur-
sion, returned to "point A") is, for purposes germane to the 
present world at large, as well as for purposes specific to the 
instant dispute, simply irrelevant. Just as thousands of 
people, on an annual basis, travel on jetliners from Salt Lake 
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City to Hawaii and back again purely for "recreation," a person 
who rides an amusement ride, such as that which was ridden by 
Ms. Lamb and her son, is riding solely for recreational purpos-
es. The fact that there may be a "destination stop," however 
brief or lengthy, in Hawaii, prior to the return trip, should 
not make the recreational trip to Hawaii any more significant, 
for purposes of the present discussion, than the kiddie roller 
coaster ride (which did not include a planned stopover), that 
was supposed to be enjoyed by Ms. Lamb and her son. The key 
consideration, as the better cases, discussed hereinabove, have 
recognized, is that one such as Ms. Lamb totally surrenders and 
entrusts herself to the expertise, care, inspection ability, 
maintenance ability, and operating ability of an operating 
entity such as B & B, and hopes to be safely transported (as a 
function of that surrendering and entrustment) from the point 
of the beginning of her excursion to the point of its expected 
safe conclusion. The fact that she is not, for some interim 
(however long or short), being deposited for business, further 
recreational, or other purposes, before her putative return 
trip begins (here to the starting point of the ride) should be 
recognized, as Judge Rigtrup failed to recognize it, as utterly 
insignificant. 
The significance of the instruction, which Ms. Lamb would 
have proposed for inclusion in the jury's charge, if Judge 
Rigtrup had not ruled, prior to trial, that the ordinary 
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negligence standard applied to the amusement park ride in 
question, cannot be overstated. The stock "JIFU" (Jury In-
struction Forms/Utah) instruction, relating to the "Duty of 
Common Carrier Toward Passenger," JIFU 31.6, based on law laid 
down by Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.. 147 P.2d 875 
(Utah 1944), and Johnson v. Lewis. 240 P.2d 498 (Utah 1952), 
provides: 
As a common carrier the defendant . . . was 
required by law to use the highest degree 
of care for the safe carriage of plaintiff, 
to provide everything reasonably necessary 
for that purpose and to exercise a reason-
able degree of skill. 
(Emphasis added.) 
If Judge Rigtrup had, as he should have, ultimately 
employed this language, or something substantially similar to 
it, rather than the "ordinary care" language that he did use in 
his charge, the jury would reasonably have been expected, in 
the context of this case, to have found B & B negligent. 
If such a correct instruction had been given (and if Judge 
Rigtrup had ruled, in the course of the pre-trial proceedings, 
that such an instruction would be given), the complexion of the 
case would have changed dramatically. Ms. Lamb would then have 
been able to present evidence and to argue, against the back-
drop of such an instruction, that B & B simply did not do 
everything reasonably imaginable that it could have done and 
should have done, in connection with (without limitation) such 
things as testing the bolts it used, inspecting the bolts on a 
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more frequent and more thorough basis than was donef and more 
frequently replacing, on a routine basis, the bolts in use (not 
to mention, in the above-emphasized language of the form 
instruction, "provid[ing] everything [including safe bolts] 
reasonably necessary for [the] purpose [of Ms. Lamb's 'safe 
carriage7]"). In light of the "ordinary care" instruction 
which Judge Rigtrup determined, prior to the commencement of 
the evidence (Record at 494-95), to give, Ms. Lamb was fore-
closed from focusing on "utmost care" areas of inquiry, in the 
course of the evidentiary phase of the trial, and from arguing, 
in the course of her summation, that B & B failed to act in 
accordance with the "highest" standard of care. Judge 
Rigtrup7s pre-trial ruling that the ordinary care standard, 
rather than the common carrier standard, was applicable to B & 
B's operation of the roller coaster was, thus, not only errone-
ous, but also most harmfully so. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING MS. LAMB'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
It is Ms. Lamb's contention that, in addition to the 
errors discussed hereinabove, that Judge Rigtrup erred when he 
allowed Dr. Blotter, B & B's expert, to testify, as he did, 
concerning the supposedly "flawed" or "counterfeit" bolt; that 
that evidence, and the allowance thereof, constituted a preju-
dicial surprise to Ms. Lamb; that, without that testimony, 
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there would have been insufficient evidence, even on a simple 
negligence basis, to support the jury's verdict, and that Judge 
Rigtrup erred, given those circumstances, in denying Ms. Lamb's 
Motion for a New Trial. 
A. Dr. Blotter's Testimony Should Not 
Have Been Allowed And It Constituted 
Prejudicial Surprise. 
As Ms. Lamb's recitation of certain aspects of the proce-
dural history of this case (see discussion at pages 11 to 17 
hereof) should make clear, she was surprised by and prejudiced 
by Judge Rigtrup's decision to allow Dr. Blotter to testify as 
he did. Not only had B & B failed, prior to trial (in viola-
tion of the letter and spirit of Rules 33(a) and 26(e)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), to disclose the substance 
of Dr. Blotter's factual inquiry and opinions in response to 
Interrogatories. B & B had also, less than two weeks before 
trial, given out the clear signal that it would be offering no 
"defect" testimony of the kind Dr. Blotter gave.7 This led 
Ms. Lamb to believe that B & B's defense to the claim of 
negligence would be limited to their own employees' testifying 
that they found part of a broken bolt, that the bolt they found 
must have been the bolt that they claim broke, and that they 
adhered to a regular inspection and maintenance process. See, 
also, the Affidavit of Dr. Blotter (Record at 149), in which 
7Please see footnote 4 (p. 15) hereof and emphasized 
portion, appearing at page 16 hereof, of B & B's "Objection to 
Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine." 
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the only opinions he offered were that, (a) the normal wear 
experienced by the bolt would not be observable from the car 
performance or from a visual inspection of the coaster, and 
that (b) if B & B adhered to its inspection and maintenance 
procedures, those procedures were adequate and the failure was 
not the result of operation or maintenance practices. Blotter 
Affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8. 
B. In The Absence Of Dr. Blotter's 
Testimony, There Would Not Have Been 
Reasonably Sufficient Evidence To Overcome 
The Inference Of B & B's Negligence. 
Judge Rigtrup correctly instructed the jury on res ipsa 
loquitur. Jury Instruction Number 14 (Record at 377-78). 
Except for the testimony of Dr. Blotter (a rocket scien-
tist, Tr. at 380-83) that the failure of the roller coaster 
most likely occurred because of a flawed or counterfeit bolt 
(Tr. at 426), the evidence pointed clearly to the conclusion 
that B & B was negligent. Dr. Blotter did not even testify, at 
trial, concerning his summary-judgment stage, affidavit-given 
opinion (Record at 149) that the maintenance and inspection 
procedures were reasonable and that if such procedures were 
followed, there was no negligence. Nor did Dr. Blotter did 
testify, at trial, despite B & B's counsel's persistent efforts 
to adduce such testimony, that, in his opinion, B & B was not 
negligent with respect to its maintenance, inspection, and 
operation of the coaster (Tr. at 426-31). 
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1. The deposition testimony (read at trial) of Stephen 
J. "Corky" Mertin IV (Buddy Mertin's son, the Safety Coordina-
tor and their man in charge of maintenance for the First Unit 
(including the subject roller coaster, Tr. at 43-44) that "you 
just give [the roller coaster] a visual inspection for cracks 
and bolts and worn areas and things" (Tr. at 50);8 
2. The testimony of Al Scanlin that ride inspections 
were done on a daily basis (Tr. at 295-97; 320) (Mr. Scanlin 
also testified (Tr. at 308-09) regarding Corky Mertin's sup-
posed role in repairing the ride after the subject incident, in 
contradistinction to Corky Mertin's abject lack of memory (Tr. 
at 54-57) of the details surrounding the incident); and 
3. Buddy Mertin's (B & B's president's) testimony that 
the connecting bolts were replaced every spring (Tr. at 93); 
that his men were trained to inspect the rides every day (Tr. 
at 64; 93-94; 101-04); that if they did not do so and did not 
turn in their inspection sheets to prove that they had done 
their inspections, they would not get clean shirts or their pay 
(Tr. at 132); and that the part of the bolt that was supposedly 
found showed no unusual wear (Tr. at 108) or no wear at all 
(Tr. at 131). 
On the other side of the equation, on a sufficiency-of-
evidence analysis, is the evidence that Ms. Lamb adduced in 
8Corky did not remember why the cars separated. Tr. at 
57. 
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(Tr. at 131). 
On the other side of the equation, on a sufficiency-of-
evidence analysis, is the evidence that Ms. Lamb adduced in 
support of her contention that B & B was negligent. That 
evidence includes: 
1. The lengthy testimony of her expert, David Stephens, 
culminating in his opinion that the bolt either (a) fell out 
because it was not tightened properly or (b) broke only after 
manifesting a condition of imminent failure that would have 
been readily observable to a reasonably vigilant B & B employ-
ee, prior to the failure itself (Tr. at 204-10); and 
2. The fact (Trial Exhibit P-l) that inspections appear 
in fact to have been done on only a very sporadic basis and 
that no inspection had been done between August 2, 1986 and 
September 4, 1996 (the date of the accident) (see, especially, 
the last page of Trial Exhibit P-l; see, also. Tr. at 95-96). 
The ride was operated at three or four other stops between 
those dates. Tr. at 120. Buddy Mertin's explanation for the 
paucity of inspection records was that there had been a truck 
rollover in which certain records had been lost (Tr. at 122-24) 
(neither side sought to put on other evidence, through Utah 
Highway Patrol accident investigation reports or otherwise, of 
this supposed occurrence) and that the B & B people who were 
supposed to do the inspections and fill out the inspection 
reports were not exactly "college graduates." Tr. at 136. 
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B & B's Al Scanlin acknowledged (Tr. at 315) that pieces of 
paper, unless they were "missing," would be the only proof that 
inspections had, in fact, taken place. Perhaps the most 
telling of evidence, in connection with B & B's supposed non-
negligence and in connection, especially, with the question of 
whether Buddy Mertin was reasonably credible with respect to 
his testimony that the inspections were in fact done on a daily 
basis, was the testimony of B & B's own Mr. Scanlin, its ride 
supervisor (whose duties included supervision of inspections 
(Tr. at 295)). When asked about another area of Mr. Mertin's 
testimony (Tr. at 132) — that the inspections were done on a 
daily basis and the inspection reports were turned in on a 
daily basis because, if they weren't, his men would receive 
neither clean shirts nor their pay — Mr. Scanlin (who was, as 
ride supervisor, presumably B & B's main person with respect to 
the inspection and safety program) testified (Tr. at 314) that 
he had no knowledge of any such policy. 
There was, in sum, absent Dr. Blotter's crucial testimony, 
utterly no credible evidence from which the jury could reason-
ably have concluded that B & B was not negligent. 
In these circumstances, Judge Rigtrup should have recog-
nized, prior to or in response to Ms. Lamb's Motion for a New 
Trial, that a miscarriage of justice had been done. He should 
have ordered a new trial for Ms. Lamb against both defendants. 
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His failure to do so constituted, in the most unusual circum-
stances of this case, an abuse of discretion. VJhen the verdict 
came back as it did, Judge Rigtrup should have righted the 
wrongs which began when he granted the Curtis Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which continued when he ruled that the jury 
would be instructed on an ordinary care standard, which contin-
ued through his allowing Dr. Blotter to testify as he did, and 
which culminated in the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Lamb implores this Court to recognize what has hap-
pened in this case and to recognize, particularly, that she was 
a fare-paying passenger (Tr. at 264) who rode on the kiddie 
coaster (consistent with B & B policy; Tr. at 139) for the 
purposes of a fun ride with her young son; that through utterly 
no fault of her own the cars separated and she was injured; and 
that, in these circumstances, she is entitled to recover 
something from somebody. 
As contended hereinabove, she believes that grievous 
errors were committed at various stages of the proceedings and 
that those issues together worked to allow a palpably unjust 
result to be worked in this case to date. She urges this Court 
to correct those errors and to rule that she be allowed to go 
to trial, simultaneously, against both defendants, and to let a 
new jury sort out and determine the issues of strict liability, 
negligence, and causation. 
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If this Court recognizes that it was reversible error for 
Judge Rigtrup to have granted the Curtis Motion for Summary 
Judgment but determines, for whatever reason, that no revers-
ible error was committed with respect, specifically, to 
Ms. Lamb's claims against B & B, she urges the Court none-
theless to adopt the wise approach taken by the Court in 
Westinahouse Elevator Co. v. Herron, 523 A.2d 723, 728 (Pa. 
1987), and to order that a new trial against both defendants be 
held. Her concern is that, if she is afforded a new trial 
against Curtis only, the roles between B & B and Curtis will 
simply be reversed; Curtis will be able to point to the empty 
chair that should be occupied by B & B and effectively contend, 
before that new jury, that the failure was the fault of B & B; 
and her nightmare of injustice will likely continue. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1991. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Petter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HERRING, TAMMY 
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VS 
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
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P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO CURTIS INDUSTRIES' PROPOSED ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AND IS HEREBY 
DENIED. THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY CURTIS INDUSTRIES, 
INC. HAS BEEN SIGNED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT JUNE 13, 1990. 
"RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS AN EVIDENTIARY RULE THAT PERMITS AN 
INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT UNDER WELL-
DEFINED CIRCUMSTANCES." KUSY V. K.MART APPAREL FASHION CORP., 
681P. 2D 1232, 1235 (UTAH, 1984). IT DOESN'T APPLY TO STRICT 
LIABILITY ISSUES. PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATED NO PRIMA FACIE EVID-
ENCE AS TO DEFENDANT CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., "THAT THE ACCIDENT 
WAS OF A KIND WHICH, IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF EVENTS, WOULD 
HAVE HAPPENED HAD DUE CARE BEEN DESERVED." 
CC: FILE 7 JUDGE / 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON - ATTY 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH FLR 
P.O. BOX 45000 
SLC, UT 84145 
PETER C. COLLINS - ATTY 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH, #4004 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Curtis Industries, Inc., 
a Delaware Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY HERRING, an individual, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
Anthony Herring, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and 
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, 
Defendants. 
The Motion of defendant Curtis Industries, Inc. came on 
regularly for a hearing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial 
Council Rules of Judicial Administration on June 4, 1990. The 
plaintiffs were represented by their lawyer, Peter C. Collins, of 
the law firm of Winder & Haslam. Curtis Industries, Inc. was 
represented by its lawyer, Robert H. Henderson, of the law firm 
Snow, Christensen fie Martineau. The Court had previously reviewed 
the file, including all memoranda. The Court fully heard the 
oral argument of counsel. The Court being fully advised in the 
PIUBWSTMCTC1BST 
Third judicial District 
JUN 1 3 1990 
Civil No. C 86-7252 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Curtis Industries, Inc. be, and hereby is 
granted. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of defendant 
Curtis Industries, Inc. and against plaintiffs, no cause of 
action. __J*-
DATED this \3> day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
IETH RIGTRUP^ 
DMJTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-2- ,.,,,_ 
INSTRUCTION NO. |ft 
The terms "negligence", "ordinary care", and "proximate 
cause", as used in these instructions, are defined as follows: 
A. "Negligence" means the failure to do what a reasonably 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances of the 
situation, or doing what such person under such existing circum-
stances would not have done. The essence of the fault may lie in 
acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated and measured by 
the exigencies of the occasion. 
B. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which a 
reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances. "Ordinary care" implies the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight 
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be 
exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person. 
You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a 
standard is not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the 
exceptionally skillful one, but a person of reasonable and 
ordinary prudence. While exceptional caution and skill are to be 
admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general 
standard of conduct. 
C. By "proximate cause" is meant that cause which in a 
natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced 
the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate 
cause of an injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or 
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Page Two 
the conduct of only one person, 
omissions of two or more persons 
efficient cause of any injury, 
participating acts or omissions is 
cause and both may be held respons 
To the contrary, the acts and 
may work concurrently as the 
and in such case, each of the 
regarded in law as a proximate 
ible. 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, tJBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant, B & B Amusements 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 By. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY HERRING, an individual 
and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
Anthony Herring, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and 
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE 
VERDICT 
Civil No. C 86-7252 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above entitled matter came on for trial beginning 
August 28, 1990, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. A jury was duly impaneled. The plaintiff, Tammy 
Jean Herring (Lamb), appeared in person and through her attorney, 
Peter C. Collins. The defendant, B & B Amusements Corp., 
appeared through its president, Steven J. (Buddy) Merten, and 
through its attorney Scott W. Christensen. 
Evidence was produced by each party through testimony 
and exhibits. The court instructed the jury on the law 
applicable to the issues of liability and damages. Counsel for 
each of the parties presented closing arguments. 
The court then submitted the issues to the jury on 
special verdict. The jury, having retired to consider the 
matter, and after deliberations, returned a special verdict as 
follows: 
We, the jury in the above entitled case, 
deliver the following answers to the 
questions submitted to us: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Was B & B Amusements 
negligent? 
Answer "yes" or "no". 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was B & B Amusements' 
negligence a proximate cause of injury to 
Tammy Lamb? 
Answer "yes" or "no". 
ANSWER: 
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2 
"no," sign and return this verdict. 
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2 
"yes," then answer Question No. 3. 
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total 
amount of "Category 1" damages (as defined in 
Instruction No. ) suffered by Tammy Lamb 
as proximate results of the accident? 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total 
amount of "Category 2" damages (as defined in 
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Instruction No. ) suffered by Tammy Lamb 
as proximate results of the accident? 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION NO. 5: Did Ms. Lamb fail, to 
any degree, reasonably to mitigate her 
damages from the accident? 
Answer "yes" or "no". 
ANSWER: If you answer 
Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
following question. If you answer Question 
No. 4 "no," sign and return this verdict. 
QUESTION NO. 6: By what amount, if any, 
do you find that Ms. Lamb failed to mitigate 
her damages through reasonable efforts? 
ANSWER: 
DATED: Sept. 4, 1990 Frank R. Davis 
FOREPERSON 
Thereafter, the special verdict to the jury was 
received by the court. The court at the request of plaintiff's 
counsel, polled the jury as to each, of the questions answered. 
Six of the eight jurors affirmed the answer to the special 
verdict interrogatory to be their own. 
Based upon the jury verdict, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the 
defendant B & B Amusements and against the plaintiff Tammy 
Herring (Lamb) Hno cause of action-. 
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2. Defendant is awarded its taxable costs, to be 
established upon submission of an affidavit by defendant's 
attorney, subject to court approval as to the amount. 
DATED this I* day of September, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
KENNE,TH RIGTRUP// • 
THIRD1 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this S— day of September, 1990, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation ceputyci. 
Attorneys for Defendant, B & B Amusements 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY HERRING, an individual, : 
Plaintiff, i 
V • J 
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and 
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an j 
Ohio corporation, ! 
Defendants. : 
: ORDER 
i Civil No. C 86-7252 
: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial, having come before 
the court on Monday, November 19, 1990, as regularly scheduled, 
plaintiff being represented by Peter C. Collins, defendant Curtis 
Industries being represented by Robert H. Henderson, and 
defendant B & B Amusements being represented by Scott W. 
Christensen; the court having heard oral argument, having 
reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
DATED this -£" day of J^^c^'m . 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ y • I/? 
KENNETH RIGTRUP / J 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this / / day of November, 1990, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Curtis Industries 
10 Exchange Place , 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
f , 
-\<s 'fJ<W 
87-483.5 
r><>,". ' ' Q 
i 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAMM? HERRING, an individual 
and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
Anthony Herring, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., and 
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE 
Civil No. C 86-7252 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
COMES NOW the defendant, B & B Amusements Corp., and 
responds to Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine. 
Defendant objects to plaintiffs' request in paragraph 
1 of their motion for a ruling that the principles of res ipsa 
loquitur apply to plaintiffs' claims against B & B. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) deals with 
questions of admissibility generally. Rule 104(a) states: 
Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b). 
nm2 
Plaintiffs' request is outside the scope of Rule 104 and as such, 
is improper• 
Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' motion requests an express 
ruling by the court that David Stephens is qualified to render 
the opinions set forth in his affidavit. This defendant renews 
its motion to strike which was previously presented to this 
court. It is B & B's position that Mr. Stephens does not have 
the necessary expertise to render opinions in this case. He has 
neither the training nor the experience which would allow him to 
render the kinds of opinions found in his affidavit. It is 
therefore respectfully submitted that the court deny paragraph 2 
of Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine. 
Defendant further objects to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' 
First Motion in Limine. In this motion, plaintiffs seek to 
prevent B & B from presenting evidence "in any way related to a 
supposedly defective bolt". Defendant B & B has maintained 
throughout the course of this litigation that the bolt utilized 
in the connector between the cars failed in this application. 
Plaintiffs have produced no rationale/ why 'that evidence, as 
testified to by .the witnesses, in their depositions, shonld not be 
presented to the jury. The reasonable interences that the .jury 
may or may not draw from that is left to the sound discretion of 
the jury. 
2 
Defendant objects to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' First 
Motion in Limine, Defendant will submit its memorandum upon the 
issue of common carrier liability immediately. 
Defendant further objects to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' 
First Motion in Limine. Plaintiffs have filed an action against 
Curtis Industries. That is a matter of record and is part of the 
pleadings. It certainly is an allegation which they have made 
and are preserving their right to pursue. If during the course 
of the trial this becomes an inconsistent position, this 
defendant feels that such evidence would be relevant to a jury's 
evaluation of plaintiffs' claims. 
DATED this f&~ day of August, 1990. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
xr)TVLt 
SCOTT WJ CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered 
this jLv^day of August, 1990/ a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to the following: 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, DT 84110-2668 
Mailed Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN St MARTINEAXJ 
Attorneys for Curtis Industries 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
87-483.62 
4 
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Peter C. Collins (#0700) 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY HERRING, et ai., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., et al. 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO CURTIS 
INDUSTRIES' OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C86-7252 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff Tammy Herring (Lamb) replies as follows to 
Curtis Industries' Memorandum in Opposition to her Motion for a 
New Trial: 
1. This case is now, contrary to Curtis Industries' 
contention, in a radically "different posture" from the posture 
it was in when the Court granted Curtis Industries' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The trial result, which was a mere unlikely, 
possibility when the Court granted that Motion, has now come to 
pass: the Court allowed B & B Amusements to put on evidence and 
contend that the Curtis bolt was defective; and the jury found 
that B & B was not negligent. 
2. As the Court will recall, the Court granted the 
Curtis Motion for Summary Judgment because Ms. Lamb was unable 
to produce satisfactory evidence that the bolt was defective. 
If the bolt was defective, her chance to produce such evidence 
was lost when B & B threw the bolt away. 
3. This case is now not only in a decidedly "different 
posture." It is in an absurd posture. For, either the B & B 
bolt was defective, or B & B was negligent, or both. But Ms. 
Lamb has, to date, been denied recovery from either defendant. 
She respectfully suggests that something has gone awry and 
that, on the facts of this case, our system ought not counte-
nance such a result. iL 
DATED this 0 day of October, 1990. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
By 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum to Curtis Industries1 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial to be hand-
delivered on the o day of October, 1990 to Robert H. 
Henderson, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place, 
2 
Eleventh Floor, Post Office Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145, and Scott W. Christensen, HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, 4 
Triad Center, Suite 500, Post Office Box 2970, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84110-2970. 
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